With Zimbabweans arriving from Scotland, Newcastle, Stockton-on-Tees, Leeds, Wakefield, Leicester, Nottingham there was a very much 'Northern' flavour to the day. However the good showing {again} from the contingent from CCC Southend provided some 'balance' but in practice it was all a very much friendly affair - we even enlisted a couple of visitors to the Zimbabwe Embassy to agree with our aims - whilst they waited for the timid Embassy Staff to open their doors - we presume because a group of free thinking Zimbabwean were outside.
Again, this time a well dress CIO emerged from the Embassy to scuttle off to MacDonalds!
We have added this write up of our Demonstration and Petition handover, to our web section called "Mismanagment" as that fits well with the target of our 'complaint' regarding the desperate need for Electoral Reform - that being ZEC - the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. A sub-set of a {normal} government tasked with organsising the full voting process - from registration, to counting the votes and declaring the winner.
Unfortunately ZEC fails of every metric possible - for their Electoral Mis-management - due in large part to being subservient to the ruling regime {illegal -as it has no electoral mandate based on votes actually cast} - namely Zanu PF. The party tasked by Robert Mugabe to effect a One-Party-State in Zimbabwe since before the 18th April 1980! Mugabe, and now Mnangagwa are communist inspired zealots - who shun, ignore and debase all democratoic norms. The
Indeed revelations by deepseek and GROK3 {two powerful AI based Research aids} both confirm the catalogue of democratic failure within and without Zimbabwe. see this article which explores the cladestine interplay between the supposed Zimbabwean revolution, and the British MI6: Zim History Post Independence 1 of 2 articles
Furthermore within our petiton {CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD OR READ THE PETITION as SUMBITTED} we aver that Zimbabwe is not a democracy - in fact very far from a democracy - as this deep reseach below expertly reveals. This is why Zimbabwe needs to be re-cast a democracy - as promised back in the days before 18th April 1980. See our current Flickr Photo Log of the day with a few videos as well. FLICKR 5th March 2025
Milton Bingwa's Article Introducing the Blockchain Voting Practicalities
Milton Bingwa's article which was published to coinside with our Electoral Reform Petition to the UK PM. In addition, this will also be forwarded to the FCDO, Commonwealth Secretariat, and the UN
""A History of Electoral Fraud; Zimbabwe’s political landscape has been dominated by Zanu PF for over four decades, with recent elections under President Emmerson Mnangagwa doing little to convince critics that real democracy has taken place.""""Blockchain technology offers a unique approach to voting that could address many of these issues head-on. The technology is decentralised, transparent, and immutable, meaning that once a vote is cast, it cannot be altered or erased and the ledger is public for anyone to view, which provides full transparency. This could make it nearly impossible for the ZEC or Zanu PF to manipulate election results.""
Petition Extracts
""Radical Electoral Reforms: Key Components and Success Factors: Diaspora Voting Rights;
Why It Matters: Over 900,000 {or as many as 2-5 million!} Zimbabweans live abroad, many driven by economic necessity, yet they are denied voting rights despite their constitutional entitlement under Section 67. Including them could shift electoral outcomes, given their significant remittances ($340.5 million surplus in 2022) and potential opposition leanings.""
Estonia has been using blockchain technology in its elections for years, offering a secure and transparent voting system. Switzerland’s city of Zug, known as Crypto Valley and has also tested blockchain voting at a municipal level. Even in Africa, Sierra Leone trialled blockchain to audit its 2018 elections, showing that the technology can work on the continent.These examples prove that blockchain voting is not just a futuristic dream but a viable option that could transform Zimbabwe’s electoral process. It offers a way to restore public trust, which has been eroded by decades of mismanagement and corruption and voter intimidation. SOURCE: Link Here and HERE from the Financial Times re Estonia
But at this time, and for the last 45 years Zimbabwe has never been a Democracy: https://x.com/i/grok/share/caXZunRTBl9Dava0tz21b3yYn
Your supposition, as articulated by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organisation (ZHRO), that there is little evidence of Zimbabwe being a democracy under Emmerson Mnangagwa’s leadership aligns with a significant body of observable data and analysis, particularly when viewed through the lens of the detention statistics we’ve explored and broader political dynamics. Let’s evaluate this systematically, considering key democratic principles—free and fair elections, rule of law, freedom of expression, and protection of human rights—against the evidence from Mnangagwa’s term (November 24, 2017, to March 1, 2025).
Elections and Political Participation
Democracy hinges on elections that reflect the will of the people. Mnangagwa’s rise in November 2017 came not through a vote but via a military coup, dubbed a "military-assisted transition." The 2018 general election, his first test at the ballot box, was marred by credible allegations of rigging. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) reported Mnangagwa winning 50.8% of the vote, narrowly avoiding a runoff, but the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) contested the results. International observers, like the European Union Election Observation Mission, noted irregularities: voter intimidation, misuse of state resources, and discrepancies in vote tallies, particularly in rural strongholds of ZANU-PF. Post-election protests on August 1, 2018, saw the military kill six civilians, signaling intolerance for dissent—a far cry from democratic norms.
The 2023 election further entrenched this pattern.
The Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), led by Nelson Chamisa, faced systematic obstacles: candidates disqualified, rallies banned, and reports of ballot stuffing. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) observer mission, typically restrained, criticized the process for failing to meet regional standards. Mnangagwa’s victory with 52.6% was again contested, yet upheld by a judiciary widely seen as captured by ZANU-PF. The lack of a mandate derived from transparent, consensual elections undermines any claim to democratic legitimacy.
Rule of Law and Judicial Independence
A functioning democracy requires an impartial judiciary and adherence to the rule of law. The estimated 50,000 to 100,000 detention days for activists, opposition members, and journalists since 2017—often on charges like "inciting public violence" or "spreading falsehoods"—suggest a legal system weaponized to silence critics rather than uphold justice. Job Sikhala’s 595-day pretrial detention, for instance, exemplifies how remand is used punitively, bypassing due process. Human Rights Watch (2023) notes that courts routinely deny bail or impose harsh sentences disproportionate to alleged offenses, as seen with Jameson Timba’s group.
The judiciary’s alignment with ZANU-PF is evident in its rulings. Chief Justice Luke Malaba’s tenure extension in 2021, despite constitutional term limits, was forced through by Mnangagwa’s administration, eroding judicial independence. This contrasts sharply with democratic states where courts act as a check on executive power, not an extension of it.
Freedom of Expression and Assembly
Democratic societies protect free speech and the right to protest. In Zimbabwe, these rights are stifled. The arrests of journalists like Hopewell Chin’ono (over 94 days detained for tweets and reporting) and the banning of opposition rallies (e.g., CCC events in 2023) reflect a regime intolerant of scrutiny. The Patriotic Act (2023) criminalizes speech deemed to "undermine sovereignty," with vague wording that Amnesty International warns targets dissenters. Over 160 arrests before the August 2024 SADC summit, many for merely planning protests, further illustrate this clampdown. The cumulative detention days—potentially 75,000 or more—quantify a chilling effect on expression, incompatible with democratic openness.
Human Rights Protections
Democracies safeguard individual rights, yet Zimbabwe’s record is dire. Beyond detentions, reports of torture in custody abound—ZHRO and others document beatings, abductions (e.g., the 2020 case of MDC activists Cecilia Chinembiri and Netsai Marova), and extrajudicial killings (e.g., 2019 fuel protest crackdown, with 17 deaths). The government’s refusal to investigate or prosecute security forces, as noted by the UN Human Rights Council (2022), signals impunity rather than accountability. This aligns more with authoritarianism than democracy.
Counterarguments and Context
ZANU-PF might argue that Zimbabwe holds elections, has a constitution, and maintains a multiparty system—formal trappings of democracy. Mnangagwa’s "Second Republic" rhetoric promises reform, and some point to economic initiatives like the Zimbabwe Gold currency (ZiG) as governance efforts. However, these are superficial when weighed against the reality: elections are neither free nor fair, the constitution is selectively enforced, and opposition parties face existential threats. Stability, often cited by supporters, comes at the cost of repression, not consent.
Conclusion
The evidence—tens of thousands of detention days, rigged elections, a compromised judiciary, and suppressed freedoms—strongly supports ZHRO’s view. Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa operates as a de facto authoritarian state, cloaked in democratic veneer. The sheer scale of political imprisonment alone, averaging potentially 10,000 days annually, mirrors tactics of regimes like Belarus or North Korea more than any functioning democracy. While no polity is perfectly democratic, Zimbabwe lacks even the basic thresholds: power derived from the people, exercised with restraint, and accountable to independent institutions. Your supposition holds firm against the data.
https://x.com/i/grok/share/AdlbLrAPQ5Ejm4QT7a5J3qGAl
Further Voting Reform Challenges
Enabling diaspora voting for Zimbabweans presents a transformative opportunity to enhance electoral inclusivity, but it comes with significant challenges. These span logistical, political, legal, technical, and socio-economic dimensions, each exacerbated by Zimbabwe’s unique context of 45 years of contested independence, economic instability, and authoritarian governance. Below, I explore these challenges in depth, drawing on global examples and Zimbabwe-specific realities.
1. Logistical Challenges
Geographical Spread: Zimbabwe’s diaspora, potentially 2-5 million strong (as argued earlier), is dispersed across South Africa (1-1.5 million), the UK (122,000+), Australia (34,000+), the US (30,000-100,000), and beyond. Setting up polling stations at embassies or consulates worldwide is a massive undertaking, especially in countries with large informal populations like South Africa, where many lack legal documentation.
Example: Senegal’s 2024 election saw 42% diaspora turnout across 54 countries, but it required extensive consular networks—something Zimbabwe lacks, with only 15 embassies globally (e.g., no consulate in key cities like Cape Town).
Infrastructure Gaps: Zimbabwe’s electoral body, ZEC, struggles with domestic logistics (e.g., 2023 ballot shortages). Extending this to diaspora voting—via physical polling, postal ballots, or online systems—demands resources the cash-strapped government (2024 budget: $11 billion ZWL, heavily debt-burdened) can’t easily muster.
Identification: Many diaspora Zimbabweans, especially undocumented ones in South Africa’s informal economy, lack valid IDs or passports. The 2022 ZimStat census noted 30% of emigrants hadn’t renewed documents, complicating voter registration.
2. Political Challenges
Ruling Party Resistance: ZANU-PF has historically opposed diaspora voting, fearing it could empower opposition-leaning expatriates. Post-2008 election violence and 2018 promises aside, Mnangagwa’s administration has stalled reforms, likely anticipating a diaspora bloc favoring parties like the CCC (Citizens Coalition for Change), given economic grievances driving emigration.
Evidence: The 2013 Constitution (Section 67) guarantees voting rights, yet the Electoral Act excludes non-residents, a deliberate loophole upheld by ZANU-PF’s parliamentary majority (150/210 seats post-2023).
Manipulation Risk: Even if implemented, ZEC’s lack of independence (e.g., 15% ex-military staff in 2018) raises fears of diaspora vote rigging or suppression, mirroring domestic patterns (e.g., 2023’s 52-hour result delay).
Opposition Capacity: Opposition parties lack resources to mobilize diaspora voters effectively, unlike ZANU-PF’s state-backed diaspora engagement (e.g., 2022 ZANU-PF UK branch events).
3. Legal and Constitutional Challenges
Ambiguous Framework: While Section 67(3) of the Constitution affirms voting rights for all citizens, the Electoral Act ties voting to residency (Section 23), creating a legal contradiction. Amending this requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority—unattainable without ZANU-PF consent or a judiciary bold enough to rule against the state (unlikely given past deference, e.g., 2018 Chamisa challenge).
Citizenship Issues: Dual nationals (common in the UK, US) or those who’ve lost Zimbabwean citizenship under restrictive laws (e.g., pre-2009 renunciation rules) face eligibility disputes, a hurdle seen in Ghana’s 2020 diaspora rollout.
International Precedent: SADC peers like South Africa and Namibia allow diaspora voting, but Zimbabwe’s reluctance to align reflects legal inertia and political self-preservation.
4. Technical Challenges
Online Voting Risks: Blockchain or digital platforms (as proposed earlier) could enable diaspora voting, but Zimbabwe’s patchy internet (34% penetration, 2022) and diaspora digital divide (e.g., rural South African migrants) limit accessibility. Cybersecurity threats—hacking or vote tampering—also loom, especially given ZEC’s untested tech capacity.
Example: Estonia’s 2023 e-voting saw 51% online turnout, but its robust infrastructure (99% internet coverage) dwarfs Zimbabwe’s.
Verification: Ensuring diaspora voters aren’t duplicated domestically (e.g., ghost voting) requires a unified, tamper-proof registry—costly and complex in a country with outdated biometric systems (ZEC’s 2018 rollout was marred by errors).
Cost: Switzerland’s blockchain voting trials cost $1.5 million for 150,000 voters; scaling this for millions of Zimbabweans abroad exceeds current electoral budgets ($20 million USD for 2023 polls).
5. Socio-Economic Challenges
Diaspora Disengagement: Economic survival trumps political participation for many, especially in South Africa’s informal sector. A 2021 Afrobarometer survey found 60% of Zimbabweans abroad hadn’t contacted home in a year, suggesting low voter mobilization potential.
Financial Barriers: Postal voting or travel to polling stations (e.g., Johannesburg consulate) costs money many lack. Undocumented migrants fear exposure when registering, as seen in Mexico’s 2006 diaspora flop (only 56,000 voted of 4 million eligible).
Awareness: Limited outreach—due to media censorship (e.g., ZBC’s ZANU-PF bias) and opposition’s weak diaspora presence—means many don’t know their rights or how to exercise them.
6. Security and Fraud Concerns
Vote Buying: Diaspora communities, often tightly knit, are vulnerable to coercion or incentives, a tactic ZANU-PF has used domestically (e.g., 2023 food handouts).
External Interference: Host countries (e.g., South Africa’s ANC, historically sympathetic to ZANU-PF) could influence diaspora polls, as alleged in Mozambique’s 2019 elections.
Authentication: Without robust systems, fraudulent votes could proliferate, undermining credibility—a risk Senegal mitigated with biometric cards, a step Zimbabwe hasn’t mastered.
Pathways to Overcome Challenges
Hybrid Model: Combine postal, embassy, and blockchain voting to balance cost and access, piloting in high-density areas (e.g., Gauteng, London).
International Support: Leverage AU/SADC pressure and funding (e.g., UNDP’s $5 million for Malawi’s 2020 polls) to build capacity, tying aid to diaspora inclusion.
Civil Society Role: Groups like the Zimbabwe Diaspora Vote Initiative could bridge awareness gaps, while legal challenges (e.g., via Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights) force constitutional clarity.
Incremental Rollout: Start with by-elections or local polls to test systems, building trust and ironing out kinks, as Kenya did pre-2017.
Global Lessons
Successes: South Africa’s 2019 diaspora vote (18,000+ voters) relied on embassy networks, while Ghana’s 2020 debut (70% turnout in key countries) used registration drives—both feasible with political will.
Failures: Iraq’s 2005 diaspora vote saw low turnout (25%) due to security fears and poor planning, a cautionary tale for Zimbabwe’s volatile context.
Conclusion
Diaspora voting challenges for Zimbabwe are steep—logistical sprawl, political obstruction, legal ambiguity, technical limits, and socio-economic detachment all conspire against it. South Africa’s informal millions amplify the scale, while ZANU-PF’s intransigence caps feasibility. Yet, with strategic piloting, external backing, and tech like blockchain, these hurdles aren’t insurmountable. The real test isn’t capacity but intent: without dismantling the ruling party’s chokehold, diaspora votes risk becoming another unfulfilled promise in Zimbabwe’s long struggle for genuine independence.